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INTRODUCTION

Prophylactic injunctions first appeared on the remedial scene
in the mid-1960s.1 Together with structural injunctions, they formed
the corpus of public law injunctions that were used to address social
institutional problems, such as school desegregation and prison civil
rights violations. “Prophylactic” measures were distinguished by
their breadth and specificity that reached the facilitators of harm in
order to prevent continued illegality.2 The success of prophylactic
relief, however, soon raised the ire of conservative critics who
attacked the ability of courts to enact injunctive relief that extended
“beyond the right,”3 for academics had initially theorized
* Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Research and Development,
The University of Akron. This paper was presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting
of the American Association of Law Schools as part of the panel “What’s
Happening With Injunctions?” during the Workshop on Remedies: Justice and the
Bottom Line.
1. E.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180 (1963) (imposing prophylactic order on investment advisor requiring
preventive disclosures to future clients).
2. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and
Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 309
(2004) [hereinafter Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy].
3. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 103–
06 (1979) (arguing that the legitimacy of courts is threatened by the extrajudicial,
political action of structural relief that seeks to produce social outcomes); William
A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 648–49 (1982) (claiming that courts lack
institutional authority to normatively assess social solutions through institutional
remedies); Donald Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1303 (1983) (arguing that
“organizational change” cases of public law injunctions do not naturally follow
from the declared right, but rather stem from improper considerations of the
managerial effectiveness of the relief); Alfred M. Mamlet, Reconsideration of
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prophylactic relief as “deliberately fashioned rather than logically
deduced from the nature of the legal harm suffered.”4 Reacting to
the conceptualization of prophylaxis as the power of an omnipotent
judge to enact new social norms based on what was morally just,
these critics turned the prophylaxis label into an epithet.
This essay critiques the continued dominant discourse of
prophylaxis as illegitimate. Despite the harsh academic and political
criticism, prophylaxis continues to thrive as an effective and
necessary component of the practical remediation of complex cases.5
Exploring the contours of prophylactic relief in federal cases
involving schools, prisons, and sexual harassment, this essay
illustrates how prophylactic relief continues to be used as a powerful
and effective remedy. The continued use, however, demands an
alternative theory of justification for prophylactic relief, for neither
the image of an omnipotent judge nor that of an activist policymaker
adequately explains the actual remedial practice. Prophylactic relief
is instead used by the courts in a more traditional and tailored way to
address public law problems. Ultimately, this essay seeks to provide
an alternative text for lawyers and jurists to use on the legal

Separation of Powers and the Bargaining Game: Limiting the Policy Discretion of
Judges and Plaintiffs in Institutional Suits, 33 EMORY L.J. 685, 685–86 (1984)
(arguing that courts in public law litigation improperly exercise legislative and
executive discretion by going beyond the traditional judicial role of enjoining the
unconstitutional practice and affirmatively prescribing governmental policy); Paul
J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 956,
972 (1978) (arguing that the proliferation of institutional remedies has improperly
broadened the scope of constitutional rights); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664
(1978) (arguing that separation of powers principles limit the ability of courts to
order structural and prophylactic relief against state officials).
4. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1298 (1976).
5. See generally Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A
Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006)
(collecting data on continued prevalence of prophylactic and structural injunctions
in prison reform cases); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004)
(discussing the persistence of public law injunctive remedies and their continued
value to the courts); Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform
Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143 (2003) (arguing
that the structural reform injunction is still alive and well in American
jurisprudence despite assertions of its demise).
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frontlines to address questions of the legitimate and appropriate use
of broad injunctive relief.

II.

THE DIFFERENCE A NAME MAKES

The term “prophylactic” derives from the Supreme Court’s
label for a specific type of injunctive relief, used both descriptively
and pejoratively by the Justices.6 The terminology usually triggers
laughs and guffaws from those hearing it for the first time. Yet, the
analogy to medical prophylaxis is useful as it connotes the use of
additional measures implemented preventively to avoid a greater
harm to an individual. Moreover, we are often stuck with the text we
are given, and here the ability to communicate effectively about the
parameters of prophylaxis requires using the existing language
common to the decided cases.
Prophylactic injunctions, like consequential damages, reach
the secondary effects of harm. Prophylaxis is characterized by the
specific precautionary measures imposed to address causal factors
with a nexus to continued violations. It is differentiated by the use of
precautions ordered to address secondary facilitators of harm to
provide more effective prevention. The additional steps reaching
contributing causes are ordered with the purpose of heading off the
harm before it develops.
Some common types of prophylactic measures emerge from
the cases. The first type involves evaluation and monitoring
measures, such as a duty to report to the court, provide access to an
investigator, or implement some ongoing oversight.7 Courts also
6. E.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 382
(1997) (Rehnquist, J.) (describing prophylactic measures as necessary where
traditional injunctions alone are insufficient); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 711–
12 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (attacking the Court’s endorsement of
“prophylactic” measure in prison reform case as illegitimate).
7. See, e.g., Skinner v. Lampert, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Wyo. 2006)
(enforcing order to monitor inmate conflicts and problematic staff members, and
terminating prior orders to investigate complaints, create incident reports, and
discipline staff); Schmelzer ex. rel Schmelzer v. New York, 363 F. Supp. 2d 453,
460–461 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (appointing monitor to submit regular reports on
compliance with Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requirement
of timely appeals for decisions regarding disabled children after defendants’
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require defendants to develop express policies to address institutional
culture and create consequences for enforcement of the policies.8
Another type of prophylactic measure is one establishing a process
or procedure like procedural safeguards, notice provisions, or
communication networks.9
Education is also a common
prophylactic measure where defendants are ordered to disseminate
information and train employees about the relevant processes and
procedures.10
Prophylaxis constitutes a distinct type of injunction within
the existing nomenclature of the law. The existing classification of
injunctive relief derives from Owen Fiss’s 1978 work, The Civil
Rights Injunction. Fiss identified three types of injunctive relief:
preventive, reparative, and structural.11 Preventive injunctions are
simple commands to stop the illegal act, such as ordering the
defendants to “stop discrimination.”12 Reparative injunctions repair
the ongoing consequences of the past harm, and might order the
reinstatement of an employee fired because of discrimination.13
Fiss’s third category of structural injunctions was used to describe
the remaining incidence of public law injunctions, especially those
that ordered change of an institutional structure to prevent further
discrimination.14 The classic illustration of a structural injunction is
repeated refusals to comply); Jones ’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1125–26
(W.D. Wis. 2001) (requiring prison to engage professional services to evaluate
incoming prisoners’ mental health, but refusing plaintiffs’ requests for monthly
court-supervised monitoring).
8. See, e.g., Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of
Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 679–80 (D.D.C. 1994) (ordering creation of sexual
harassment policy after consultation with national prison experts); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (ordering patient bill of rights
spelling out minimal rights and duties).
9. See, e.g., In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(ordering extensive protections prior to welfare agency’s removal of children from
custody of battered mothers, including preparing bilingual informational
pamphlets, limiting removal periods, and creating a review committee); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ordering procedure for “hearing,
adjudicating, and remedying” complaints of sexual harassment of prison staff).
10. See, e.g., Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 681–82 (ordering training of
both staff and inmates conducted by industry expert on sexual harassment); Bundy,
641 F.2d at 948 (ordering training on how to report sexual harassment).
11. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7–8 (1978).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 7.
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an order to integrate the schools to rectify or prevent continued racial
discrimination.15 Prophylactic measures were bound up in structural
relief as part of complex orders directing appropriate preventive
steps for defendant institutions. As I have discussed in prior work,
the courts eventually began to carve out these prophylactic measures
from the structural injunction ball of wax because they differed
significantly in character and because categorization enabled courts
to refine the contours of such relief. 16
Prophylactic
FACILITATORS
Preventive
Reparative
CAUSE-------HARM-----CONSEQUENCES

FACILITATORS
S T R U C T U R A L
The value of recognizing a separate category of prophylactic
injunctions lies in the ability to use the doctrinal language as a
yardstick of legitimacy. The adoption of a fourth classification of
injunctive relief offers an analytical foundation for the legitimacy of
some, but not all, prophylactic measures. The classification counters
some of the criticism of prophylaxis (and all public law injunctions)
by circumscribing the scope of appropriately broad relief.
Encapsulated as a doctrinal rule, prophylaxis provides a legal text for
lawyers to use in navigating the policy concerns involved in crafting
appropriate injunctive relief.

15. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955) (Brown
II).
16. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 2, at 316–21; see also Tracy
A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of
Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 373 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas,
Understanding Prophylactic Remedies] (distinguishing prophylactic remedies
from other remedies).
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PROPHYLAXIS IN ACTION

Prophylaxis came to the forefront through its grassroots
development in institutional reform cases involving schools, prisons,
and other public institutions. Prophylaxis can be effective against
institutional defendants when faced with the difficulties of enforcing
judicial relief against legislative or administrative agents.17 Yet its
effectiveness has not been confined to public settings, as the remedy
can be found in business and economic regulation cases.18 The
functionality of the prophylactic remedy transcends the specific
context of a case as it enables courts to translate abstract norms into
concrete action.
I came to my own understanding of prophylactic remedies
while litigating a prison reform case in practice. In the case of
Women Prisoners of the D.C. Department of Corrections v. District
of Columbia, we were faced with the task of crafting proposed relief
for the class of women prisoners following a successful trial
establishing constitutional violations from the sexual harassment and
assault of the women, the unhealthy environmental conditions, and
the gender discrimination in work and educational programs.19 The
defendants’ history of similar violations and the egregious nature of
the harms weighed in favor of practical alternatives that could
effectively halt the behavior. We developed a series of measures—
including a hotline, grievance system, reporting mechanisms, expert

17. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 766–69 (1992) (discussing how the Court’s
decisions regarding enforcement of remedies tolerate “channeled defiance” of
federal court remedial orders); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE
L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (“The function of a remedy is to ‘realize’ a legal norm, to
make it a ‘living truth.’ While most legal theory concentrates on the ideal, the
hard stuff of recalcitrant reality is equally important to jurisprudence.”).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d. 144, 164
(2002) (imposing prophylactic measures to prevent antitrust monopoly); Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963)
(ordering investment advisor to disclose his own personal dealings in securities
recommended to clients in order to prevent fraud).
19. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), modified, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C.
1995), vacated in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming all injunctive
measures in extensive order related to constitutional claims, but invalidating
appointment of special officer to monitor and investigate complaints).
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consultation and staff training—designed to head off the problems
by addressing the contributing causes of the harm.20
In this way, prophylactic relief develops almost instinctively
from lawyers and jurists seeking remedial alternatives to empty
commands simply to stop the behavior. The actors in the legal
drama are closest to the specifics and details of the case and can
readily identify what types of preventive steps might effectively curb
the illegal behavior in the future. Prophylaxis therefore has a
practical, intuitive appeal that resonates with practitioners and judges
who seek tangible remedial solutions to difficult problems.
The grassroots evolution of prophylactic relief has developed
in many institutional contexts. Today, such relief has become
commonplace in sexual harassment cases. Rather than simply
commanding the offending institution to “harass no more,” courts
order policy changes, training, education, and sanctions to address
institutional factors that facilitate continued harassment.21 The
preventive power of prophylactic measures has taken on new
meaning as the U.S. Supreme Court has elevated these measures to
the stature of a safe haven from liability. In Kolstad v. American
Dental Association, the Court held that a company that voluntarily
adopts prophylactic measures, like anti-harassment programs,
demonstrates the good faith necessary to avoid punitive damages
under a vicarious liability theory.22
Another prototypical category of prophylactic relief comes
from the school desegregation cases. The desegregation cases
helped develop prophylactic relief as courts struggled to deal with
the difficult legal problem of entrenched race discrimination and
contemptuous defendants. For example, in the case of Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, approved prophylactic
measures included racial quotas, gerrymandered attendance zones,
20. Id. at 679–81.
21. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946–948 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(ordering institution to adopt procedures for “hearing, adjudicating, and
remedying” staff complaints of sexual harassment); Sims v. Montgomery County,
766 F. Supp. 1052, 1080 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (ordering grievance procedures, officer
education program, and changes in procedures for promotions, discipline,
transfers, and job assignments); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827,
829 (Iowa 1990) (upholding injunction requiring sexual harassment education and
training plan).
22. 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999).
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and busing, as the courts tried to reach the contributing economic
and residential causes of continued segregation.23 More recently,
courts have adapted prophylactic measures in school cases to address
violations of federal statutes like Title IX and special education
laws.24
Prophylactic relief grew in popularity in the prison conditions
cases spanning the end of the twentieth century. Recalcitrant prison
defendants were forced into a semblance of compliance by court
orders dictating specific measures to avoid unconstitutional
conditions. Prisons were given detailed orders regarding law
libraries, environment, health, recreation, punishment, and food in
order to curtail continued abuses.25 Such prison litigation became
the political target of conservative reformers who sought to restrict
the expansion of public law injunctions.26
Congress responded to the perception of illegitimate
prophylactic relief in prison condition cases by enacting the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”).27 The PLRA targeted
negotiated consent decrees, but requires that all injunctions be
“narrowly drawn,” “extend[] no further than necessary,” and be “the
23. 402 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1971).
24. E.g., Schmelzer ex. rel. Schmelzer v. New York, 363 F. Supp. 2d 453,
461 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (appointing monitor to submit regular reports on compliance
with the IDEA’s requirement of timely appeals for decisions regarding disabled
children after defendants’ repeated refusals to comply).
25. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (limiting time in punitive
isolation); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (ordering prison to
modify policies and procedures to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled
prisoners and parolees, to provide effective communication regarding hearings and
appeals, and to select accessible facilities); Jones ’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d
1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (requiring prison to engage professional services to
evaluate incoming prisoners’ mental health).
26. 141 CONG. REC. S14611, S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dole) (speaking in support of proposed legislation that would “restrain liberal
Federal judges who see violations of constitutional rights in every prisoner
complaint and who have used these complaints to micromanage State and local
prison systems”); id. (statement of Sen. Hatch) (asserting that judges had “gone too
far in micromanaging our Nation’s prisons”); Edwin Meese III, Putting the
Federal Judiciary Back on the Constitutional Track, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781,
790–93 (1998) (arguing that Congress should “block activist federal judges” and
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases like prison litigation where it
was dissatisfied with the judicial results).
27. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).
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least intrusive means necessary” to correct a violation of a federal
right.28 While the PLRA curtailed some use of injunctive measures
in prisons, courts have continued to use prophylactic measures
effectively in conditions cases.29 The PLRA, however, stands as an
example of what many critics believe is the right approach to
restricting the scope and prevalence of public law injunctions.30

IV.

DISPUTING PROPHYLAXIS AS JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

The dominant narrative of prophylactic and structural relief is
that it is judicial policymaking and unwarranted judicial activism.31
The accusation is that the remedies go beyond the right and are based
illegitimately on the judge’s personal vision of justice rather than on
proper law, facts, and judicial authority.32 Courts are accused of
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (1997).
29. See, e.g., Skinner v. Lampert, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1276–85 (D. Wyo.
2006) (finding prophylactic measures requiring conflict documentation system,
investigation, reporting, incident tracking, education, and incorporation of policies
to be narrowly tailored to harm of preventing inmate violence as required by
PLRA); Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 872–73 (finding prophylactic measures designed
to prevent violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act by prison were
appropriate under the PLRA).
30. See ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE
191–92 (2003) (arguing that courts and Congress should follow the PLRA’s model
of restriction for all public law injunctions); Meese, supra note 26, at 790–93
(calling for more legislative strategies like the PLRA to enable Congress to change
the policies and practices resulting from judicial decisions).
31. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (Scalia, J.) (“It is the
role of courts to provide relief to claimants . . . it is not the role of courts, but that
of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as
to comply with the laws and the Constitution.”); id. at 364 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the Constitution charges federal judges with deciding
cases and controversies, not dictating policy); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
132 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There simply are certain things that courts,
in order to remain courts, cannot and should not do.”); see generally John Choon
Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of
the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123–24 (1996) (arguing that the
judiciary’s assertion of inherent remedial power for structural injunctions violates
principles of judicial restraint and oversteps the Article III limitations on the
federal courts).
32. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3, at 649 (claiming that prophylactic and
structural injunctions are based upon the moral and political intuitions of judges);
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“micro-managing” and invading the power of the state administrative
authorities to make and execute policy decisions.33 This attack on
prophylaxis is part of a broader attack on public law remedies that
highlights problems with complex decrees, aspirational rights, and
the controlling power group of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, special
masters, and cooperative defendants.34
The criticism of prophylactic relief as judicial activism is an
obvious reaction to the original theorization of public law relief as
unfettered judicial power. Images of a moralistic judge imposing
new legal norms through a participatory rather than adjudicatory
process set up prophylactic relief as an alternative to regular judicial
action. Professors Fiss and Chayes originally argued that judges
should engage in social justice and the preservation of public values
by doing what was “right” through the use of public law
injunctions.35 They envisioned a moralistic judge who would rectify
injustice by the elaboration and expansion of legal norms. At the
same time, a corollary theory developed arguing for a participatory,
Horowitz, supra note 3, at 1304 (arguing that judges in institutional remedy cases
are “vehemently partisan” and personally invested in the outcome of the
litigation); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 960 (suggesting that institutional decrees are a
result of the judge’s personal desire to do good and eliminate a social evil).
33. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 30, at 7–8 (asserting that
institutional reform injunctions constitute “democracy by decree” where judges
make policy decisions and dictate how to comply with the law, thus improperly
assuming the responsibilities of mayors, governors, and legislators); Nagel, supra
note 3, at 706–23 (critiquing structural injunctions on separation of powers
grounds).
34. For example, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod argue against the
ability of courts to issue public law injunctions, and particularly consent decrees,
because of threats to accountability and democracy raised by the difficulties of
enforcing aspirational rights; problems with the controlling group of plaintiffs’
attorneys and acquiescent defendants; case management problems of special
masters; exploding class actions; and the ineffectiveness of such decrees.
SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 30, at 9–12. However, they reserve the
power of the court to issue prophylactic injunctive measures where the defendant
is likely to evade the decree. Id. at 166; see also David Schoenbrod, The Measure
of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the
Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 671–82 (1988) (arguing that judges may issue
prophylactic injunctions in situations demonstrating the defendant’s proclivity to
violate an order).
35. Chayes, supra note 4, at 1282–83; Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1982); Owen M. Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979); OWEN M. FISS,
THE LAW AS IT COULD BE xi–xii (2003).
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deliberative process alternative to litigation for public law remedies
and their polycentric problems.36 The argument was that traditional
litigation was unable to handle the complexity and enforcement of
public law rights, which required more problem-solving techniques
and procedures found in mediation or administrative processes.37
This notion of the incapacity of litigation to handle institutional
reform cases reinforced the notion of prophylaxis as something
extra-judicial. Finally, prophylaxis was justified as a judicial “rule”
of interpretation or implementation inspired by the legal right.38
This construct moves prophylaxis closer to the normal range of
judicial activity, but reinforces the notion of judicial omnipotence.
These theories promoting judicial remedial activism and reforming
courts continue to dominate modern discourse.39
However,
justifications based on judicial omnipotence and extra-judicial
conduct draw criticism like magnets.
The theories of judicial omnipotence jeopardize the
availability of prophylactic relief by conceptualizing it as something

36. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEO. L.J. 1355, 1427–44 (1991) (outlining a “deliberative model of public
remedial decisionmaking”); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978) (distinguishing private, bilateral adjudication,
from “polycentric,” multi-party, multi-issue, policy-driven public litigation).
37. Sturm, supra note 36, at 1357, 1428.
38. See Henry Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1975) (“[T]he case law . . . is . . . highly suggestive of a sizable
body of constitutionally inspired implementing rules whose only sources are
constitutional provisions framed as limitations on government.”); David A.
Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 195 (1988)
(asserting that there is nothing “extraordinary” about prophylactic rules that
impose additional requirements beyond those of the Constitution itself and that
such rules can be “justified in ways that are analytically indistinguishable from the
justifications for the Miranda rules”).
39. See, e.g., Beth V. v. Carroll, 155 F.R.D. 529, 530, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(citing with favor Chayes’ theory of the role of the judge in public law litigation
and discussing the need for alternative deliberative processes in decision
appointing special master for special education case); FISS, supra note 35, at 48–55
(discussing the “structural reform” model of adjudication based on the notion that
judges give concrete meaning and expression to the public values embodied in the
law); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 3–6
(1998) (arguing that judges should continue to engage in judicial policymaking in
the context of prison reform litigation).
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outside the judicial norm. If prophylaxis cannot be accomplished
using the regular adjudicatory process and common judicial
practices, then it does not belong within the halls of the judiciary.40
The theories of moral justice thus risk the evisceration of the
prophylactic remedy.
However, the existing theories of omnipotent judging do not
accurately describe the operation of prophylactic relief. Recent
analyses supporting public law remedies challenge the social justice
theories and place public law remedies within the usual realm of
judicial remedial action.41 The prevalence of prophylaxis suggests
the time has come to stop theorizing prophylaxis as other. The
alleged hallmarks of public law litigation—justice, rulemaking, and
alternative dispute resolution—are found in most cases.42 Private
law litigation is no longer segregated, assuming it ever was, from
public law litigation by these attributes of judicial problem solving.43
The polycentric nature of the issues in many public law cases is also
nothing unusual, as the advent of class actions, mass torts, and other
aggregative litigation make such large-scale cases commonplace.
In other words, prophylaxis needs no supporting theory other
than that generally applicable to equitable relief. Of course, the
40. See Diver, supra note 3, at 63 (arguing against public law injunctions on
the ground that the judicial intuition model falls outside the objective, rational
norm of the adjudication model).
41. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 5, at 1100 (noting that the process of
public law litigation is consistent with judicial practice in common law cases and
compatible with democratic accountability); Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra
note 2, at 362–70 (refuting the standard assumption that judges create prophylactic
remedies out of whole cloth, and instead demonstrating the ordinary judicial
processes of hearings, evidence, and factual-findings utilized in such cases);
Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation
and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 (2003) (concluding
from study of school desegregation remedies from 1992 to 2002 that judges do not
behave in atypical, activist ways in imposing public law remedies, but rather
follow a process common to most private litigation).
42. Honorable William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism,
Address at the George Washington Univ. Nat’l Law Center (Mar. 10, 1992), in 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1992) (asserting that so-called “remedial activism”
is nothing more than the traditional role of the judge to resolve disputes in both
private and public law matters).
43. Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 2, at 362–63; Robert G. Bone,
Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute
Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1296–98
(1995).
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equitable power of the court itself has also been under attack.44
However, the judicial equity power is well-grounded in our
common-law system as a fluid and flexible power necessary to
redress gaps in the law.45 Prophylaxis is part of this heritage of
equity that empowers courts to enforce legal rights in a meaningful
way.

V.

THE FUTURE OF PROPHYLAXIS

My prediction is that prophylactic injunctions will continue
as courts learn to tailor relief appropriately in order to take advantage
of the efficacy of prophylaxis. As a precise remedial mechanism,
rather than a catchall power, prophylaxis promises to remain a viable
remedial tool. The evidence is clear that public law injunctions are
alive and well. Despite the conventional wisdom that institutional
reform litigation peaked long ago, the studies show the continued
utility and importance of public law injunctions.46 Prophylaxis
seems to work. It provides practical, tangible solutions to often
insurmountable problems involving intangible rights.
Over time, the courts have resisted efforts to turn
prophylactic relief into a catchall remedy and instead have

44. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Brown II’s “All Deliberate Speed” at Fifty:
A Golden Anniversary or Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a
School Desegregation Remedy?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2004)
(detailing Justices Thomas’ and Scalia’s criticisms of equitable relief); Tracy A.
Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1070–74
(2003) (describing Justice Scalia’s approach to narrowing equitable relief to only
those traditional writs historically available under English common law).
45. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980)
(demonstrating a historical foundation for complex public law injunctions as part
of the “normal” litigation tradition).
46. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 5, at 554 (concluding from longitudinal
account of jail and prison injunctions that civil rights injunctions continue to
thrive); Sabel & Simon, supra note 5, at 1018–19, 1021 (noting the “protean
persistence of public law litigation” and concluding there “is no indication of a
reduction in the volume or importance of Chayesian judicial activity”).
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circumscribed its applicability.47 The many examples of prophylaxis
gone awry have been used to invalidate the entire category of
relief.48 The Fiss-Chayes theory of omnipotent judging encouraged
courts to morph prophylaxis into a catchall, omnibus remedy. Since
then, however, remedial excess has carefully been reined in by the
courts, which have followed the Supreme Court’s rules of limitation
in evaluating the propriety of prophylactic relief. Accordingly,
courts have denied requested prophylactic relief in the absence of a
legal harm.49 Prophylaxis has been denied when it is asserted as an
entitlement, as when previously-ordered measures take on a life of
their own.50 Courts have cut back on prophylactic measures when
the asserted relief does not benefit the actual plaintiffs.51 These
47. See Schlanger, supra note 5, at 605 (documenting the transformation of
public law injunctions in prison cases from a “kitchen sink” remedy to a refined
remedial tool).
48. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362–63 (1996) (using one
example of judicial overreaching in prison law library injunction to condemn all
prophylactic and structural relief); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 30, at
139 (using a handful of examples of over-broad injunctions to conclude that
“[d]emocracy by decree is a good thing gone wrong.”).
49. See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350–351 (invalidating injunction mandating
all aspects of an adequate prison law library where the operative right was the right
of access to the courts, rather than a per se right to a library); Hadix v. Johnson,
367 F.3d 513, 529 (6th Cir. 2004) (invalidating injunction where fire safety
deficiencies failed to constitute constitutional violations); Sisneroz v. Whitman,
No. 01-5058, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67107, at *9–10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006)
(denying injunctive relief because “laundry list” of requests for conditions of
prison confinement—such as limited strip searches, exercise periods, and cell
assignments—did not relate to any actual imminent harm arising out of civil
detention).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (denying claim of failure
to provide Anders brief for withdrawal of counsel because the procedure was
simply a prophylactic measure ordered by the Court in a prior case to avoid future
constitutional violations); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350–51 (refusing to convert
prophylactic measure of adequate prison law library ordered in Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817 (1977) to ensure right of access to the courts into a federal right to
prison libraries); see also Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies, supra
note 16, at 379–85 (explaining and discounting the phenomenon by which
prophylactic remedies create a mirage of new rights).
51. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 441 F.3d 1287, 1304–05 (11th Cir.
2006) (denying requested relief of access to sexual harassment policies,
investigation of complaints, and dispute resolution processes where plaintiff’s
harassers had left university); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359 (striking down systemwide
remedy regarding various aspects of prison law library—including lighting,
materials, operating hours, and bilingual materials—where relief did not connect to
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limitations are really nothing new, as the usual rules of remedies
require that a legal harm to the plaintiff be proven in court before
imposition of a judicial remedy. Thus, the usual limitations work to
curtail prophylaxis and keep it from becoming anything and
everything that does not fit within the confines of another remedy.
In addition, prophylaxis’s future looks bright because it is a
remedy of last resort. It is not the first line of response for a court,
but rather is reserved for particularly recalcitrant defendants.
Significantly, institutional defendants are given a first chance to
remedy the harm themselves.52 Only where that attempt fails, or
where the defendant has violated a less intrusive preventive
command or engaged in repeated patterns of illegal conduct, is there
sufficient defiance to trigger prophylaxis.53 This results in a
remedial rule of injunctive relief that is highly deferential to, and
therefore more palatable to, defendants.54
By limiting prophylaxis to its proper application—as a
remedy of last resort protecting a proven right by addressing
facilitators causally linked to the harm—courts have responded to
the perceived abuse of prophylactic excess, leaving in place a viable
plaintiff’s harm of denial of court access because of illiteracy); Hadix v. Johnson,
173 F.3d 958, 964 (6th Cir. 1999) (overturning award of systemwide legal writer
program to ensure prisoners were able to prepare legal pleadings on the ground
that the district court interpreted prisoners’ injuries too broadly).
52. See, e.g., Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25295, at *20–21 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2005) (requiring defendant prison to
submit a remedial plan within 30 days after cooperative planning with plaintiffs);
Ginest v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1209–10 (D. Wyo. 2004)
(ordering prison to submit remedial plan within 30 days to improve gross defects
in medical program); see Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional
Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 797–99, 803 (1978) (describing
“remedial abstention” in which the court defers to the defendants’ creation of an
injunctive remedy).
53. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994)
(upholding portions of a modified injunction against an anti-abortion group, where
the group had violated a preliminary injunction to cease blocking or interfering
with the clinic entrance).
54. See Parker, supra note 41, at 1623 (arguing that the traditional role of the
district judge in controlling school desegregation cases has been ceded to the
defendants); Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale
of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 511 (1999) (arguing that remedies in
school desegregation cases are controlled by defendants, as dictated by the
Supreme Court).
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remedial option. Rejecting the outmoded theories of prophylaxis as
omnipotent judicial power stops the frontal attacks on such relief and
directs scholars toward alternative theorization of public law relief.
Given the prevalence of prophylaxis and its place within the normal
remedial framework, its continued vitality is assured.

